Tax 2018: Requiem for Ability to Pay by Abreu, Alice G.
Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School
Digital Commons at Loyola Marymount
University and Loyola Law School
Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review Law Reviews
1-1-2018
Tax 2018: Requiem for Ability to Pay
Alice G. Abreu
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law
School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons@Loyola
Marymount University and Loyola Law School. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@lmu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Alice G. Abreu, Tax 2018: Requiem for Ability to Pay, 51 Loy. L.A. Rev. 61 (2018).
51.1_ABREU_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 3/27/2019 4:41 PM 
 
61 
TAX 2018: REQUIEM FOR ABILITY TO PAY 
Alice G. Abreu 
 
 Enactment of the TCJA was followed by a mad dash to 
understand its effects.  The speed and process of enactment 
left no time for serious attempts to analyze whether the TCJA 
transforms the income tax system in any fundamental way. 
This Essay is a first step in that analysis. Although some of 
the most important changes I discuss are set to expire or 
phase out after 2025, understanding their policy 
implications is important, not only because they are the law 
now but also because Congress may extend them, perhaps 
indefinitely. 
 The TCJA has changed the way the tax system 
operationalizes the principles of horizontal equity and ability 
to pay, has brought the base of the regular tax closer to the 
base of the AMT, and has increased the number of tax 
provisions that have been promulgated in the form of 
standards, which will require the deployment of significant 
administrative and judicial resources before they can be 
implemented effectively. By removing consideration of 
taxpayers’ support obligations from the tax base (except as 
relevant to the determination of filing status in the case of 
taxpayers who might qualify for the statuses of head of 
household or surviving spouse), the TCJA has jettisoned the 
value of ability to pay. It has unmoored the tax base zero 
bracket from the poverty level and created a system in which 
two taxpayers with very different ability to pay as a result of 
 
  Professor of Law, Temple University Beasley School of Law. I want to thank Karen 
Hawkins, Chair of the ABA Section on Taxation, for inviting me to participate in a panel discussion 
at the Council Lunch held during the Section’s Winter Meeting on February 8, 2018, which led me 
to write this Essay. I am grateful to my colleagues Rick Greenstein, Andrea (Andy) Monroe, and 
Rachel Rebouche for careful reading and constructive comments on prior drafts. Thanks also to 
Marty McMahon, who taught me much that is in this Essay over the course of our various 
collaborations, and who shared a draft of a then-unfinished article that provided valuable 
background on the development of the dependency exemptions, standard deduction, and zero 
bracket amounts, as well as relevant citations, many of which I have used here. John Richey 
(Temple ‘18), once again provided exemplary research assistance. All errors, regrettably, are my 
own. 
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support obligations will be taxed the same, and in which two 
taxpayers with the same ability to pay will be taxed 
differently. The TCJA has turned the concept of horizontal 
equity on its head.  In some cases the tax base will even be 
the taxpayer’s gross income in its entirety, subjecting to 
taxation even the amount needed for minimal subsistence.  
 Under the TCJA the income tax will tax income from 
labor differently depending on the form in which the labor is 
performed. Labor income earned in the form of wages—by 
the performance of services as an employee—will be fully 
taxed at ordinary income rates. But some income earned by 
the performance of labor in any other way—as an 
independent contractor, for example—will be taxed at only 
80 percent of the rate that would otherwise apply. Ability to 
pay is irrelevant. 
 Although the foregoing fundamental changes to the tax 
system were not clearly identified and debated by scholars 
and tax professionals prior to enactment, the idea of shifting 
to a territorial system was. The TCJA rejects the principle of 
capital export neutrality, thereby creating a dramatic 
difference in the tax burden placed on income as a result of 
its source:  henceforth, much foreign source income received 
by some U.S. persons, in the U.S., will not be subject to U.S. 
income tax, ever. But the shift to territorial is incomplete. 
The TCJA distinguishes between the taxation of foreign and 
domestic source income only for some taxpayers. It lacks a 
comprehensive policy foundation either domestically, or 
internationally. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Just about everyone knows that the tax system changed at 
midnight on New Year’s Eve, 2017, and much intellectual firepower 
has been deployed in the service of understanding the new provisions. 
Tax scholars and practitioners have already written what amounts to 
volumes both describing the new law (informally known as the Tax 
Cuts and Jobs Act, (“TCJA”))1 and suggesting ways in which 
taxpayers will likely exploit its provisions.2 But in the flurry of activity 
to understand the TCJA and its effects, almost no attention has been 
paid to analyzing whether the TCJA transforms the income tax system 
in any fundamental way.3 This Essay is a first step in that analysis. 
The TCJA transforms the income tax system in at least four 
fundamental ways, significantly undermining one of the bedrock 
principles of our tax system—horizontal equity4—and ignoring one of 
its most important animating principles—ability to pay. It does this in 
several ways. First, the TCJA eliminates consideration of a taxpayer’s 
support obligations in determining the tax base, thereby creating a 
situation in which two taxpayers with wildly differing ability to pay 
will nevertheless face equal tax burdens. Second, the TCJA unmoors 
the zero bracket—the amount of income that will never be included in 
 
 1. An Act to provide for reconciliation pursuant to Titles II and V of the concurrent resolution 
on the budget for fiscal year 2018. Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 
2054 (2017). Although the legislation included the short title “Tax Cuts and Jobs Act,” and is often 
referred to by that name, a practice which I will follow here, the name was stricken by the Senate 
Parliamentarian immediately prior to the Senate’s passage of the final bill. 
 2. Reuven S. Avi-Yonah et al., The Games They Will Play: Tax Games, Roadblocks, and 
Glitches Under the 2017 Tax Legislation, SSRN (Dec. 22, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=3089423. 
 3. A notable exception is the Griswold Lecture, delivered by Professor Marty McMahon to 
the American College of Tax Counsel on February 10, 2018. Martin J. McMahon, Jr., 2018 Erwin 
N. Griswold Lecture Before the American College of Tax Counsel: Tax Policy Elegy, 71 TAX L. 
421, 430–35 (2018). 
 4. Horizontal equity is the concept that similarly situated taxpayers ought to be treated 
similarly and is one of the three fundamental tenets of U.S. tax policy. David Elkins, Horizontal 
Equity as a Principle of Tax Theory, 24 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 43, 43 (2006). The other two 
bedrock principles are vertical equity and simplicity (or administrability). See Reuven S. Avi-
Yonah, The Three Goals of Taxation, 60 TAX L. REV. 1, 1 (2006). Vertical equity is the concept 
that tax burdens should vary with ability to pay, or put another way, that dissimilarly situated 
taxpayers ought to be treated dissimilarly. R.A. Musgrave, In Defense of an Income Concept, 81 
HARV. L. REV. 44, 45 (1967). Simplicity is the concept that the tax system should be simple enough 
to be understood by taxpayers and administered by the IRS. See Edward J. McCaffery, The Holy 
Grail of Tax Simplification, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 1267, 1270–71 (1990). 
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the tax base—from the poverty level, which means that taxpayers with 
income significantly below the poverty level may nevertheless face 
positive tax liabilities.5 Third, the TCJA creates a distinction between 
types of income from labor, reserving for employees the highest 
possible rate and making the rate dependent on the form in which 
personal services are rendered. Fourth, the TCJA rejects the principle 
of capital export neutrality, thereby creating a dramatic difference in 
the tax burden placed on income as a result of its source. Henceforth, 
much foreign source income received by some U.S. persons in the 
U.S. will not be subject to U.S. income tax, ever. And despite the 
importance of these four effects, only the last was widely anticipated 
(at least in part), and debated and analyzed by tax scholars and 
professionals prior to enactment. 
In the six parts that follow I will discuss each of these changes 
(Parts II–V), make some additional general observations (Part VI), and 
conclude (Part VII). Although some of the most important changes I 
discuss are set to expire or phase out after 2025, understanding their 
policy implications is important, not only because they are the law 
now but also because Congress may extend them, perhaps 
indefinitely.6 
II.  ERADICATING SUPPORT OBLIGATIONS FROM THE TAX BASE 
A.  Eliminating the Deduction for Support 
The TCJA almost doubles the standard deduction and completely 
eliminates the deductions for personal and dependency exemptions,7 
thereby changing the tax base from one in which taxpayers with like 
support obligations were treated alike, into its antithesis. Under the 
 
 5. See JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, JCX-3-17, ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES 
FOR FISCAL YEARS 2016–2020 4 (2017) [hereinafter JCT Tax Expenditure Estimates 2017]. 
 6. See, e.g., Tony Nitti, Tax Reform Phase 2: Pending Reality or Political Posturing?, 
FORBES (May 16, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/anthonynitti/2018/05/16/tax-reform-phase-
2-pending-reality-or-political-posturing/#144b88387e01; Jeff Stein, Republicans Explain Why 
Their Tax Cuts Are Temporary, But Not Really Temporary, WASH. POST (Nov. 30, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2017/11/30/republicans-explain-why-their-tax-
cuts-are-temporary-but-not-really-temporary/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.4500cc673285; see also 
infra note 46 and accompanying text. 
 7. Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 11021(a)(7)(A), 131 Stat. 2054, 
2072 (2017); id. § 11041(a)(5)(A), 131 Stat. at 2082. Technically, it must be noted that the 
deduction for personal and dependence exemptions is not eliminated, as section 151 remains a part 
of the Code. Nevertheless, section 151(d)(5) provides that for the years 2018–2025, the exemption 
amount will be zero, thus eliminating the deduction in fact. 
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TCJA, taxpayers with very different non-discretionary legal 
obligations will have equivalent tax bases, thereby turning the 
principle of horizontal equity on its head. As a result, the TCJA 
changes the tax system from one which endeavored to calibrate the tax 
base to a taxpayer’s ability to pay, into one which now provides close 
to a one-size-fits-all definition of the tax base. 
This is especially salient when it comes to determining the 
amount of subsistence that should not bear any income tax burden at 
all. Although horizontal equity and ability to pay still underlie the 
determination of filing status and some of the itemized deductions that 
remain, the elimination of the personal and dependency exemptions 
means that only the vertical aspect of equity continues to exert 
significant influence on the design of the tax base. 
Moreover, when the elimination of the deduction for alimony 
becomes effective in 2019,8 the TCJA will have succeeded in 
eradicating support obligations from the determination of the tax base 
(except to the extent implicit in the determination of filing status).9 
The tax system will then determine the tax base of dis-similarly 
situated taxpayers similarly—precisely the opposite of what the 
principles of horizontal equity and ability to pay require.  
Without a deduction for alimony or for personal and dependency 
exemptions, two single individuals who take the basic standard 
deduction can have identical tax bases even though they differ 
dramatically in their ability to pay. If, for example, those two 
individuals have $100,000 of wage income and no adjustments to 
income or qualified business income, their tax base will be the same 
even though one has an obligation to support a former spouse and one 
does not, and even if one has several children or other dependents to 
support, and the other does not.10 The tax system did not achieve 
perfect horizontal equity before the TCJA, but in removing 
consideration of a taxpayer’s obligations of support in the 
determination of the tax base (except as they affect filing status), the 
TCJA deals horizontal equity a near-fatal blow. 
 
 8. Id. § 11051(a). 
 9. Support obligations are relevant to determining whether a taxpayer qualifies for the filing 
status of head of household and surviving spouse, because both statuses require that the taxpayer 
have a particular type of dependent. I.R.C. §§ 2(a)–(b) (2018). 
 10. This assumes that both individuals are the same age and are both either blind, or sighted. 
See id. § 63(c)(2). 
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The effect of removing consideration of support obligations from 
the tax base is especially dramatic for some nonresident aliens who are 
living and working legally in the U.S. but who will now be taxed on 
their gross income—full stop.11 This will occur because nonresident 
aliens cannot take the standard deduction, even if they are subject to 
full U.S. taxation on their income effectively connected with the 
conduct of a trade or business in the U.S. at regular U.S. tax rates and 
have no other source of income.12 Therefore, now that the deduction 
for personal and dependency exemptions has been eliminated, some 
nonresident aliens will have to pay U.S. tax at regular ordinary income 
rates on their U.S. gross income, with no regard whatsoever for their 
obligations to support themselves or any dependents. Indeed, because 
the TCJA also eliminated the deduction for unreimbursed employee 
business expenses as well as the deduction for expenses paid or 
incurred for the production of income,13 nonresident aliens subject to 
U.S. tax on effectively connected income will not even be able to take 
into account unreimbursed costs of earning the income they are being 
taxed on, unless they are independent contractors.14 
This might not seem troubling because most aliens who are 
physically present in the U.S for more than half of the taxable year 
will become U.S. residents for tax purposes regardless of their 
immigration status;15 they will therefore be able to take the standard 
deduction if their tax liability is attributable to relatively substantial 
participation in the U.S. labor market. But this will not occur in cases 
where the nonresident individual is exempt from the physical presence 
 
 11. Thanks to Carol P. Tello, a tax partner in the Washington, D.C. office of Eversheds-
Sutherland, for this insight. 
 12. I.R.C. § 63(c)(6) (2018) (denying the standard deduction to nonresident aliens); id. 
§ 871(b)(1) (taxing nonresident aliens on their income effectively connected with the conduct of a 
trade or business in the U.S. at the rates provided in sections 1 and 55). Of course, providing 
services as an employee is a trade or business. 
 13. Both of those deductions are miscellaneous itemized deductions, defined in § 67(b); 
§ 67(g), added by the TCJA, eliminates the deduction of miscellaneous itemized deductions for the 
years 2018–2025. 
 14. An independent contractor, not an employee, will be able to deduct the ordinary and 
necessary expenses of carrying on her trade or business above the line (that is, from adjusted gross 
income). Id. § 62(a)(1). As with the other TCJA changes to the individual provisions of the Code, 
the fact that they are scheduled to sunset in 2025 does not diminish their importance, not only 
because they have real impact on real taxpayers until then, but also because members of Congress 
have made no secret of their intention to make the changes permanent. 
 15. Id. § 7701(b)(1)(ii), (b)(3). 
51.1_ABREU_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 3/27/2019  4:41 PM 
68 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51:61 
test for U.S. tax residency.16 These exempt individuals are students, 
researchers, diplomats, and others who enjoy immigration statuses that 
cause them to be regarded as nonresident aliens for tax purposes even 
though they are legally living and working in the United States for 
substantial periods of time. Still, because they are classified as 
nonresidents they will now be taxed without any regard to ability to 
pay—no standard deduction and no personal or dependency 
exemptions.17 For them, the repeal of the personal and dependency 
exemptions magnifies the extent to which the heretofore bedrock 
concept of ability to pay is no longer at the core of the U.S. income 
tax system.18 
B.  Effect of Eliminating the Inclusion of Alimony  
in the Recipient’s Income 
Moreover, by eliminating the deduction for alimony, the TCJA 
undermines horizontal equity in an additional way. Eliminating the 
deduction for alimony requires eliminating the correlative inclusion of 
alimony in the recipient’s income, and the TCJA does just that.19 But 
excluding alimony from income will produce a situation in which 
taxpayers with wildly disparate ability to pay, as measured by 
economic income, will appear to have equivalent ability to pay, as 
measured by taxable income. This will occur because the receipt of 
the alimony, which necessarily increases a taxpayer’s ability to pay as 
measured by economic income, will be ignored in the determination 
of the tax base—alimony will not be treated as income. Therefore, an 
individual who receives $40,000 of alimony in addition to $40,000 of 
wages will look to the tax system precisely like one who receives only 
 
 16. Id. § 7701(b)(3)(B) (individual is present in the U.S. for less than half of the year and has 
closer connection to another country); id. § 7701(b)(5) (exempt individuals). 
 17. This will not occur in cases where the individual is entitled to the benefits of an income 
tax treaty that exempts him or her income from U.S. taxation. See, e.g., UNITED STATES MODEL 
INCOME TAX CONVENTION, ARTICLES 19 AND 20 (2006). 
 18. This is particularly ironic because the exemption of certain individuals from the operation 
of the provisions that would make them U.S. residents based on physical presence alone otherwise 
has the salutary effect of protecting them from the worldwide reach of U.S. taxation of residents. 
Compare I.R.C. § 61 (2018), with id. § 871. The repeal of the dependency exemption turns the pro-
taxpayer effect of the residency exemption provisions on its head. 
 19. The TCJA does just that by repealing section 71, which provides that alimony will be 
included in the recipient’s income unless the taxpayer provides otherwise. Id. § 71(b)(1)(B); Tax 
Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 11051(b)(1), 131 Stat. 2054, 2089 (2017). 
Without section 71 alimony will be treated as support, which has never been regarded as gross 
income; even if that proposition were debatable, non-inclusion is the only conclusion that can 
follow from the deliberate repeal of section 71. 
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$40,000 of wages, even though the first individual has $80,000 of 
economic income and therefore has twice as much ability to pay as the 
first. 
Conversely, two individuals with the same economic income and 
hence the same ability to pay will be treated for tax purposes as if they 
had wildly differing ability to pay. For example, an individual who 
receives $40,000 of alimony arguably has the same ability to pay as 
one who receives $40,000 of wages. Yet, the two individuals will be 
treated very differently by the income tax system. The first 
individual—the alimony recipient—will be seen by the tax system as 
having zero income, and hence zero ability to pay. The second 
individual—the wage earner—will be seen by the tax system as having 
$40,000 of ability to pay, even though based on economic income she 
has the same ability to pay as the alimony recipient. 
The picture worsens if employment taxes (principally social 
security and medicare) are considered. The wages will be reduced by 
the employment taxes, so that the $40,000 wage earner will have less 
ability to pay than the alimony recipient, who receives $40,000 of 
alimony without deduction for employment taxes. That well-advised 
divorcing couples will be able to factor tax effects into amounts 
actually paid does not alter the normative import of the change.20 
C.  Availability of Credits Does Not Erase the  
Normative Import of the Change 
Moreover, that credits take into account family size and other 
obligations in determining the amount of tax actually paid does not 
alter the fact that the TCJA has changed the determinants of a key 
component of the fundamental structure of the tax system: the tax 
base. First, the two large refundable credits that take into account 
family size—the Earned Income Tax Credit (“EITC”) and the Child 
Tax Credit (“CTC”)—are available only with respect to qualifying 
children, not other dependents, with two relatively small exceptions.21 
 
 20. For additional illustrations of the effect of this change, see Neil Buchanan, The Ability to 
Pay Principle and the Counterintuitive Distributive Justice Analysis of Alimony Payments, 
JOTWELL (July 2, 2018), https://tax.jotwell.com/the-ability-to-pay-principle-and-the-counter 
intuitive-distributive-justice-analysis-of-alimony-payments/ (reviewing a draft of this Article). 
 21. The first exception is that the CTC now provides a $500 credit for dependents who are not 
qualifying children. I.R.C § 24(h)(4) (2018). That is only 25% of the $2,000 credit allowed for 
qualifying children, up to $1,400 of which is refundable; the $500 dependent credit is not 
refundable. I.R.C § 24(h)(5)(A) (2018). The second exception is that a very small EITC ($519 in 
2018) is available to single individuals without children; single individuals with up to three children 
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In addition, qualifying children that allow taxpayers to claim the CTC 
must be under 17 regardless of their status as students, unlike 
dependents. Moreover, neither the EITC nor the CTC take into 
account obligations to support dependent non-children, including 
individuals who are members of the taxpayer’s household even though 
they are not lineal descendants and in other cases are not members of 
the taxpayer’s physical household at all but are nevertheless 
dependents.22 The latter would include support obligations to former 
spouses and relatives whom the taxpayer supports even though they 
do not live with the taxpayer, such as elderly parents. Finally, the ETIC 
is available only to taxpayers who have earned income that does not 
exceed certain thresholds, which range from $15,010 for a single 
individual with no qualifying children to $53,930 for a married couple 
with three children.23 In addition, neither credit is available to 
individuals with income above the phaseout amounts, or to those who 
are U.S. residents for tax purposes but who lack social security 
numbers.24 
Perhaps more importantly from a normative standpoint, even if 
refundable credits could compensate completely for the elimination of 
support obligations as determinants of the tax base (except with 
respect to filing status), that elimination will have effected a 
fundamental change in the structure of the tax system. Personal and 
dependency exemptions were such an integral part of the 
determination of the tax base that the Joint Committee on Taxation did 
not score them as tax expenditures.25 As the Joint Committee has 
explained, 
Under the Joint Committee staff methodology, the normal 
structure of the individual income tax includes the following 
 
may receive an EITC of $6,431 in 2018, however. I.R.C § 32 (2018); see 
https://www.irs.gov/credits-deductions/individuals/earned-income-tax-credit/eitc-income-limits-
maximum-credit-amounts-next-year. 
 22. I.R.C. §§ 152(b)(3)(A) (contiguous country exception), 152(d)(2)(h) (qualifying relative) 
(2018). 
 23. 2017 EITC Income Limits, Maximum Credit Amounts and Tax Law Updates, IRS (Jan. 23, 
2018), https://www.irs.gov/credits-deductions/individuals/earned-income-tax-credit/eitc-income-
limits-maximum-credit-amounts. 
 24. I.R.C. § 32 (2018). 
 25. JCT Tax Expenditure Estimates 2017, supra note 5, at 3. Indeed, the JCT classifies the 
phase-out of personal and dependency exemptions under the regular tax and their complete 
disallowance under the AMT as negative tax expenditures. Id. at 39. That follows logically from 
the definition of tax expenditures: the phase-out and disallowance raise revenue that the normal tax 
would not. 
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major components: one personal exemption for each 
taxpayer and one for each dependent, the standard deduction, 
the existing tax rate schedule, and deductions for investment 
and employee business expenses. Most other tax benefits for 
individual taxpayers are classified as exceptions to normal 
income tax law.26 
By contrast, most credits, especially refundable credits like the 
EITC and the CTC, which take family size into account in determining 
final tax liability, are tax expenditures. But tax expenditures are not 
considered part of “the normal structure of the individual income 
tax.”27 On the contrary, tax expenditures are generally regarded by 
scholars as interlopers—blots upon the “normal structure” of the tax 
system.28 
Eliminating the deductions for personal and dependency 
exemptions therefore represents a change to the “normal structure of 
the individual income tax.”29 Even if the effect of that change is 
ameliorated by the operation of a tax expenditure, the change remains 
important. A shift in the values that inhere in the tax system occurs 
when the tax base—the normal tax system—changes, even if the 
ultimate effect of that change is ameliorated by tax expenditures that 
 
 26. Id. The JCT’s description of its methodology suggests that the features it identifies, 
including the personal and dependency exemptions, are conceptually inseparable from the very idea 
of an income tax and that, therefore, an income tax lacking these features would be, if not abnormal, 
then at least something other than the income tax as we have known it. 
 27. Id. at 3, 39. 
 28. See, e.g., Edward D. Kleinbard, Lecture, The Congress Within the Congress: How Tax 
Expenditures Distort Our Budget and Our Political Processes, 36 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 1, 1–3 (2010); 
Daniel N. Shaviro, Rethinking Tax Expenditures and Fiscal Language, 57 TAX L. REV. 187, 188–
89 (2004). Although my colleague, Rick Greenstein, and I have argued in recently published work 
that this characterization of tax expenditures as something other than a proper part of the normal 
tax structure is misguided, that is not the general view now, and tax expenditures continue to play 
a role in the way tax provisions are conceptualized. See Alice G. Abreu and Richard K. Greenstein, 
Rebranding Tax / Increasing Diversity, 96 DENVER L. REV. 1 (2018). Unless and until Congress 
repeals the 1974 Budget Act which requires the promulgation of a Tax Expenditure Budget, the 
concept of tax expenditures and its bifurcation of tax provisions into “normal” and “other” will 
likely remain at the heart of mainstream tax analysis. I therefore treat it as such here. 
 29. JCT Tax Expenditure Estimates 2017, supra note 5, at 3. The phaseout of the personal and 
dependency exemptions produced by section 151(d)(3) did not cause the kind of fundamental shift 
I am discussing here. Even though it could result in the complete elimination of any deduction for 
personal and dependency exemptions, the provision had no effect until a taxpayer’s AGI reached a 
certain amount, $100,000, adjusted for inflation provided in section 68. That phaseout, like the 
phaseout of some itemized deductions under section 68 itself, was intended to raise the tax rate of 
high-income individuals, without changing the section 1 rates themselves. It was part of the 
erstwhile progressivity-through-the-back-door that made the Tax Reform Act of 1986 possible. See 
Michael J. Graetz, Tax Reform Unraveling, 21 J. ECON. PERSP. 69, 69 (2007). 
51.1_ABREU_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 3/27/2019  4:41 PM 
72 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51:61 
reduce the final tax liability of some taxpayers. Moreover, no tax 
expenditure ameliorates the change to the normal structure of the tax 
system wrought by the elimination of the deduction for alimony—
spousal support—which is also not classified as a tax expenditure.30 
Hence, even if the EITC and CTC had been expanded to 
compensate fully for the elimination of the personal and dependency 
exemptions—and they have not been—and even if they were available 
to all taxpayers—which they are not31—and even if the TCJA had 
introduced a credit for alimony paid—which it did not—the dramatic 
change to the “normal structure of the tax system” would endure. That 
tax expenditures might ameliorate the effect of the fundamental 
change in the normal structure of the tax system cannot eradicate the 
importance of the change. The change downgrades important values 
that have animated the tax system almost from its inception so that 
they are no longer a proper part of the tax party—they have become 
party crashers, if they are present at all.32 
The values reflected by a tax system that takes support obligations 
into account in determining one of its most fundamental 
components—the tax base—are substantially different from those of 
a system that does not value the importance of support obligation 
enough to take it into account in the determination of the tax base. 
Accounting for support obligations in determining the tax base 
operationalizes the value of horizontal equity, which goes to the heart 
of the fairness, and hence the legitimacy, of the tax system. By 
disregarding such obligations and leaving a taxpayer who has three 
 
 30. See JCT Tax Expenditure Estimates 2017, supra note 5, at 3, which does not treat I.R.C. 
§ 215, which provided a deduction for alimony, as a tax expenditure. 
 31. See supra Part II.C. Moreover, provisions like the EITC and CTC cannot account for 
support obligations in the way that dependency exemptions did because they are specifically 
designed to apply only to a segment of the taxpaying population. By design, the EITC and the CTC 
apply only to taxpayers who fall within a defined income range and who possess certain other 
characteristics. For example, both phase in and phase out, and neither applies to all individuals who 
bear full U.S. tax liability because they are U.S. residents for tax purposes. The EITC does not 
apply to individuals who do not have social security numbers and file using an ITIN, I.R.C. § 32(m), 
or to married taxpayers who must file separately, I.R.C. § 32(d); as of 2018, the CTC does not apply 
with respect to any child who has an ITIN, I.R.C. § 24(h)(7), and only applies with respect to 
children under 17, I.R.C. § 24(c)(1). Moreover, the additional $500 nonrefundable credit provided 
by section 34(h) in lieu of the CTC makes up for the loss of a deduction of a dependency exemption 
of $4,000. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.  
 32. The 1913 income tax, the first constitutional income tax, provided personal exemptions. 
Act of Oct. 3, 1913, ch. 16, § 2(C), 38 Stat. 114. Dependency exemptions have been allowed since 
1917. Act of Oct. 3, 1917, ch. 63, § 1203(1), 40 Stat. 300, 331. The standard deduction was added 
in 1944. Individual Income Tax Act of 1944, ch. 210, §§ 5, 10(a), 58 Stat. 231. 
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children with a tax base that is the same as that of a taxpayer with no 
children at all, the tax system is devaluing the obligation of support 
and undermining the fairness, and hence the legitimacy, of the tax 
system. That in a given year for a given type of taxpayer tax 
expenditures may alleviate the sting of a horizontally inequitable tax 
base is irrelevant as a normative matter, at least as long as tax 
expenditures are not viewed as part of the “normal” structure of the 
tax system.33 With the TCJA the “normal” structure of the tax system 
has been transformed from one in which the determination of the tax 
base was calibrated to the circumstances of the taxpayer, into one in 
which one type is supposed to fit, if not all, then at least many. 
III.  UNMOORING THE ZERO BRACKET FROM THE POVERTY LEVEL 
Despite nearly doubling the standard deduction, the TCJA 
changes the normal structure of the tax system in another important 
way: it significantly reduces the zero bracket that ensured that 
taxpayers with a limited amount of income—aspirationally amounting 
to bare subsistence no higher than the poverty level—would bear no 
income tax liability on the receipt of that income.34 As the Joint 
 
 33. Contemporary tax analysis distinguishes between tax expenditures—provisions aimed at 
promoting social policies for purposes other than raising revenue—and provisions which are 
directed at “the fundamental purposes of the tax law: accurately measuring income and collecting 
revenue.” Linda Sugin, Tax Expenditures, Reform, and Distributive Justice, 3 COLUM. J. TAX L. 1, 
4 (2011). In other work, my colleague, Rick Greenstein, and I have suggested a way in which the 
conceptual bifurcation of the tax law which follows from the concept of tax expenditures may 
contribute to the relative lack of diversity in the tax bar. See Alice G. Abreu & Richard K. 
Greenstein, Rebranding Tax / Increasing Diversity, 96 DENVER. L. REV. 1 (2018). The concept of 
tax expenditures may do that because it treats provisions that overtly implicate social values as 
unwelcome interlopers into a tax system that would otherwise be a pristine revenue raising 
machine. Id. at 4. We argue against such a conceptual bifurcation and show that all Code provisions 
implicate social values. However, unless and until our more holistic view of the tax system becomes 
more widely disseminated and eventually accepted, analysis has to proceed on the current view of 
the tax system, and that view treats tax expenditures as extraneous to the tax system. 
 34. Congress first sought to designate an amount of income representing subsistence that 
would never be subject to tax in 1964 with the introduction of a “minimum standard deduction.” 
H.R. REP. NO. 749, at 148 (1963), reprinted in 1964-1 C.B. pt. 2 125, 148–49; S. REP. NO. 88-830, 
at 29–30 (1964), reprinted in 1964-1 C.B. pt. 2 505, 533–34. In 1969, Congress replaced that 
minimum standard deduction with a “low income allowance” that was pegged to the poverty level 
and intended to ensure that income below that level remained tax free. Tax Reform Act of 1969, 
Pub. L. No. 91-552, § 802, 83 Stat. 487, 675–76; H.R. REP. NO. 99-413, pt. 1 (1969); S. REP. NO. 
91-552, at 257–260 (1969), reprinted in 1969-3 C.B. 423, 586–87. In 1976, Congress changed the 
functional zero bracket created by the low-income allowance into an actual zero bracket, which 
lasted until 1986, when it was replaced by the standard deduction. See Tax Reform Act of 1986, 
Pub. L. 99-841, 100 Stat. 682; H.R. REP. NO. 99-841, pt. 2 at 5–7; JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, JCS-
10-87, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986 15 (1987). Since 1986, a de-
facto zero bracket is the result of the standard deduction and personal exemptions; the sum of those 
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Committee has explained, its staff viewed “the personal exemptions 
and the standard deduction as defining the zero-rate bracket that is a 
part of normal tax law.”35 But the TCJA changes the size of that zero 
bracket not only dramatically but in a way that produces the antithesis 
of horizontal equity and ignores a taxpayer’s ability to pay. For 
example, a single individual with no children, who would have had a 
zero bracket of $10,400 in 2017,36 and would have had a zero bracket 
of $10,650 in 2018 without the TCJA,37 will have a zero bracket of 
$12,000 in 2018. That is obviously an increase and brings the zero 
bracket closer to the poverty level ($12,060 for 2017),38 and that is 
good.39 
However, if that individual did not qualify for head of household 
filing status despite having two dependents, in 2018 her zero bracket 
amount would remain at $12,000.40 That individual would be treated 
just like one who had no dependents even though her support of the 
two dependents puts her in an economic position that is substantially 
different. Without the TCJA her 2018 zero bracket amount would have 
been $18,950,41 but with the TCJA it is only $12,000. Her tax base has 
increased significantly even though her ability to pay, as measured by 
her obligations of support, has not. Her zero tax base of $12,000 is 
 
two amounts create a de-facto zero bracket because all individual taxpayers are entitled to them, 
which ensures that an amount of gross income equal to the sum of the standard deduction and 
personal and dependency exemptions will never be included in the tax base. 
 35. JCT Tax Expenditure Report, supra note 5, at 4. 
 36. This zero bracket is the sum of the standard deduction of $6,350 plus a personal exemption 
of $4,050. Rev. Proc. 2016-55, 2016-2 C.B. 707. 
 37. This zero bracket is the sum of the standard deduction of $6,500 (which is the amount that 
would have applied in 2018), plus the personal/dependency exemptions of $4,150 that would have 
applied in 2018 ($12,450). Rev. Proc. 2017-58, 2017-40 I.R.B. 489. 
 38. U.S. CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, FEDERAL POVERTY LEVEL 
(2017), https://www.healthcare.gov/glossary/federal-poverty-level-FPL/. 
 39. That the result—greater congruency between the zero bracket amount and the poverty 
level—is good, is separate from the question of whether the particular measure of the poverty level 
is a good one. Whether this measure of the poverty level adequately reflects subsistence is an 
important question but further analysis of it is beyond the scope of this Essay. For a thoughtful 
analysis see, e.g., Francine J. Lipman, (Anti)Poverty Measures Exposed, 21 FLA. TAX REV. 389, 
399 (2017). 
 40. That could occur because not all dependents qualify an individual for head of household 
filing status. For example, a brother or sister of the taxpayer could be a dependent if they are 
disabled and the taxpayer pays more than half of their support, but if they do not live in the 
taxpayer’s household for more than half of the taxable year, they will not enable the taxpayer to 
claim head of household status. I.R.C. § 2 (b)(1). 
 41. That is the sum of the $6,500 standard deduction plus three personal exemptions of $4,150 
as provided by Rev. Proc. 2017-58, 2017-40 I.R.B. 489. 
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now also significantly below the poverty level for a household of three 
people: $20,420.42 
The more dependents the taxpayer has the more pronounced the 
disjunction between the zero bracket and the poverty level. And that 
is no accident. It happens because the poverty level increases as 
household size increases. The poverty level goes up by just over 
$4,000 for each additional member of the household, which is almost 
precisely the inflation-adjusted amount of the pre-2018 personal and 
dependency exemptions ($4,050 for 2017). But after 2017, the tax 
base does not go up at all unless the other member of the household is 
the taxpayer’s spouse (increased standard deduction), or a dependent 
who qualifies the taxpayer for head of household filing status 
(increased, though not double, standard deduction and immutable 
despite the number of qualifying dependents) or qualifying widow(er) 
status (double standard deduction).43 Although the poverty level will 
continue to rise with household size, the amount the tax system regards 
as bare subsistence that should not be subject to tax will remain 
unchanged after the TCJA. Therefore the gulf between what the tax 
system regards as subsistence and what is actually required for 
subsistence, as measured by the poverty level, will widen. 
The effects are similar for married couples: the zero bracket was 
$20,080 for a couple with no dependents in 2017 but it is $24,000 in 
2018. That is a meaningful increase. It raises the zero bracket from the 
$21,300 it would have been in 2018 without the TCJA and brings it 
significantly above the poverty level of $16,240 for 2017. But for a 
couple with two dependents the picture is starkly different. That 
couple would have had a zero bracket of $29,600 in 2018 without the 
TCJA,44 but they will now have a zero bracket of only $24,000 in 
2018—and $5,600 of their income that would not have been subject 
to any income tax in 2017 will be subject to tax in 2018.45 Although 
 
 42. See supra note 38. 
 43. See I.R.C. § 63(c)(2) (2018). 
 44. This is the sum of the standard deduction of $13,000, which is the 2018 amount under 
Rev. Proc. 2017-58, 2017-40 I.R.B. 489, plus four personal/dependency exemptions of $4,150 
each, which means that the total deduction attributable to personal/dependency exemptions in 2018 
would have been $16,600. 
 45. The $5,600 is the difference between what would have been the zero bracket amount 
without the TCJA ($29,600) and what is the zero bracket amount in light of the TCJA ($24,000). 
Whether such couple will receive any relief from the EITC or CTC is far from clear. The CTC does 
not apply if the dependents are children over 16, I.R.C. § 24(c)(1), and neither it nor the EITC apply 
if the dependents do not fit the definition of “qualifying child,” I.R.C. §§ 24(c)(1), 32(c)(1), 
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that couple’s zero bracket is only a little less than the poverty level of 
$24,600, if they have another child their zero bracket will remain the 
same even though the poverty level for their family would now rise to 
$28,780, and the obligation to support the third child will have 
significantly reduced their ability to pay.46 
In setting the zero bracket the tax system makes an important 
normative determination of how much income a taxpayer should be 
able to receive before having positive tax liability. It is saying 
something about subsistence. By ignoring family size except as it 
affects filing status, the tax system is ignoring the impact of family 
size on subsistence, and hence on ability to pay. As with the 
determination of the tax base discussed above, that tax expenditures 
may ameliorate this effect does not detract from the conclusion that 
the TCJA has made a profound change in the extent to which the 
normal tax system values the principles of horizontal equity and ability 
to pay. 
 Whether that difference is positive or negative is an important 
question, but I do not intend to engage with it here. My purpose is 
much more limited. I simply want to point out that the TCJA has made 
a fundamental change in the determination of the tax base—one that 
reflects a fundamental change in the values the income tax system is 
founded on. That fundamental change was neither specifically 
identified nor discussed or debated publicly as the legislation made its 
quick trip through Congress and on to the President’s desk. Of course, 
reasonable people can certainly differ on the question whether the 
simplicity and administrability gains that follow from eliminating the 
personal and dependency exemptions and the deduction for alimony 
are worth the horizontal equity costs of measuring the tax base without 
reference to those support obligations. But my point is that this 
 
whereas the dependency exemption was available with respect to dependents who were not 
qualifying children, I.R.C. § 152(a)). Moreover, the CTC is not available if the child does not have 
a social security number, I.R.C. § 24(h)(7), and the EITC is not available if anyone listed on the 
return does not have a social security number, I.R.C. § 32(m). As stated earlier, it is unlikely that 
the $500 CTC available for non-qualifying children dependents would put such taxpayers in the 
same position they would have been in had the TCJA not been enacted. See supra note 31. And 
even if it did, and reduced the amount of tax the taxpayers would pay, it would not change their 
zero bracket amount and the policy implications of having produced a tax system does not consider 
support obligations in the determination of the normative tax base. 
 46. U.S. CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, FEDERAL POVERTY LEVEL 
(2017), https://www.healthcare.gov/glossary/federal-poverty-level-FPL/. The poverty level 
numbers used are 2017 numbers because no such numbers existed for 2018 when this Essay was 
written. 
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specific tradeoff was neither identified nor debated before the TCJA 
became law. And that is unfortunate. 
The fact that these fundamental changes are temporary, because 
they disappear when the provisions that effectuate them sunset after 
2025,47 does not alter this conclusion. The sunset resulted from a 
desire to avoid the constraints imposed by the Senate’s “Byrd Rule,” 
which limited the amount of revenue the legislation could lose 
overall,48 not from any suggestion that policy changes reflected by the 
legislation should not be made a permanent part of the Code. On the 
contrary, members of Congress expressed the expectation that future 
Congresses would enact legislation to remove the sunset,49 which only 
increases the importance of debating the policy choices that the 
changes reflect. 
The policy choices made in the TCJA implicate fundamental 
principles of tax policy. For example, the elimination of the role of 
support in the measure of the tax base (other than in the determination 
of filing status), might be analyzed and justified as the price of 
simplifying the tax law by removing a taxpayer’s need to determine 
which individuals qualify as her dependents. But not only does that 
assume that simplification gains justify equity losses, it also elides the 
question of how extensive any simplification gains really are. And if 
the role of refundable credits is to be taken into account in determining 
the equity tradeoff on the ground that credits restore the support 
concerns previously operationalized by deductions, then the simplicity 
costs of administering those credits have to be taken into account as 
well. 
Accounting for the role of refundable credits in restoring support 
obligations as an important determinant of the tax base changes the 
equity/simplicity trade-off. Even if credits could completely make up 
 
 47. I.R.C. § 63(c)(7) (2018). 
 48. See Jonathan Curry, Senate Republicans Contort Tax Bill to Fit Byrd Rule Box, TAX 
NOTES (Nov. 16, 2017), https://www.taxnotes.com/editors-pick/senate-republicans-contort-tax-
bill-fit-byrd-rule-box; see also Danielle Kurtzleben & Scott Neuman, Senate Approves Landmark 
Tax Overhaul, Bill Returns to House, NPR (Dec. 19, 2017), https://www.npr.org/2017/12/19/57 
1982251/republicans-set-to-pass-tax-overhaul-as-early-as-tuesday-night. The Byrd Rule prohibits 
reconciliation legislation, legislation which can be passed with a simple majority, from increasing 
deficits beyond the 10-year budget window. By having certain revenue-losing provisions in the bill 
sunset before the end of that 10-year period, drafters were able to comply with the rule. 
 49. See Kurtzleben & Neuman, supra note 48. House Speaker Paul Ryan stated, “We have 
every intent of making those permanent—because of the Senate rules, you know why that sunset is 
there.” Id. 
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for the lost dependency deductions (and in a substantial number of 
cases, e.g., non-children, they cannot), the complexity inherent in the 
operation of the credits makes nearly irrelevant any simplicity gains 
from the elimination of the deductions. The reason is that determining 
eligibility for the most fiscally significant portion of both the EITC 
and the CTC requires that the taxpayer determine if she has a 
“qualifying child.”50 But to do that, the taxpayer has to make precisely 
the same determination she would have had to make to determine 
whether she could take a dependency exemption for that child. The 
Code defines a dependent as a qualifying child or a qualifying relative, 
and having a qualifying child is what makes a taxpayer eligible for the 
fiscally significant portions of the EITC and CTC.51 This means that 
removing the dependency exemption produces exactly zero simplicity 
gains. The only simplicity gain that actually follows from eliminating 
the dependency exemption while retaining the EITC (for individuals 
with children) and the large and refundable portions of the CTC, is 
that determination of dependency status for “qualifying relatives” is 
no longer necessary.52 Although eliminating the deduction for alimony 
does offer simplicity gains, no credit allows the taxpayer to account 
for that support obligation in determining tax liability. Indeed, the new 
and supposedly much simpler (and shorter) Form 1040 (depicted 
below) allocates what seems to be the same amount of space for 
entering information about dependents as the old Form 1040.53 
 
 
 
 
 
 50. See supra note 48. By ‘fiscally significant’ I mean the portion of the EITC that is large, 
and the portion of the CTC that is both large and refundable. Although the EITC is available to 
single individuals with no qualifying children, its amount in such cases is dramatically smaller than 
the amount that would go to the same individual if she had a qualifying child. For 2018, the 
difference is $2,942 (that is the difference between $519, the maximum credit amount for a single 
individual, and $3,461, the maximum credit amount for an individual with one qualifying child. 
2018 EITC Income Limits, Maximum Credit Amounts and Tax Law Updates, IRS, 
https://www.irs.gov/credits-deductions/individuals/earned-income-tax-credit/eitc-income-limits-
maximum-credit-amounts-next-year. In the case of the CTC, the maximum amount available for a 
non-child is $500, and it is not refundable. I.R.C. § 24(h)(2), (4)(A). 
 51. I.R.C. § 152(a). 
 52. I.R.C. § 152(d)(1). Making the determination of who is a qualifying relative can be mind-
numbingly complex. Even a quick perusal of section 152(d) reveals why.  
 53. Form 1040, https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f1040.pdf. 
51.1_ABREU_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 3/27/2019  4:41 PM 
2018] EXAMINING THE TAX CUTS AND JOBS ACT 79 
 
In more general terms, many of the simplification gains exist on 
the surface only. Analysis of the statutory language of the TCJA 
reveals that the architecture of the Code on the question of who is a 
dependent remains unchanged; the need to determine who is a 
dependent has not been eliminated at all. The determination of 
whether one individual is the dependent of another is pivotal not only 
for the determination of filing status (both the head of household and 
surviving spouse statuses require that the taxpayer have a particular 
kind of dependent),54 but also for determining eligibility for the EITC 
and CTC, as discussed above.55 Hence, even if the provisions 
eliminating the deduction for dependency exemptions did not sunset, 
the complex web of rules that determine whether an individual is a 
dependent would need to remain.56 Although there are some simplicity 
gains from not having to take the exemptions, precisely how large the 
simplicity gains are is not at all clear. Moreover, even if the simplicity 
gains were substantial, no pointed debate over the merits of sacrificing 
equity on the altar of simplicity took place. And that should distress 
anyone who cares about tax policy. What the TCJA does to the 
taxation of income from labor, discussed below, should as well. 
IV.  CREATING TWO TYPES OF INCOME FROM LABOR 
The TCJA creates a new category of income that distinguishes 
between types of income from labor. Before the TCJA, the tax system 
 
 54. I.R.C. § 2(a)–(b) (2018). 
 55. See supra text accompanying notes 50–52. 
 56. This would be true even if the changes to the amount of the exemption had been made 
permanent. 
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distinguished between income from capital and income from labor, 
taxing much of the income from capital at a preferential rate.57 But the 
same rates of tax applied to all income from labor.58 Indeed, much of 
the kerfuffle over the tax treatment of carried interests can be seen as 
proceeding from the conviction that such amounts represented 
 
 57. Generally, the maximum rate on long-term capital gains is 20%. See I.R.C. § 1(h)(1) 
(2018). Although the net investment income tax imposed by section 1411 increases the rate of tax 
on some investment income by 3.8%, that increase does not apply to all investment income. It only 
applies to investment income above a certain threshold amount ($250,000) and is therefore more 
appropriately characterized as a mechanism to increase the progressivity of the tax system rather 
than as a structural feature of the taxation of income from capital. Through the capital gains 
preference, the tax system distinguishes between the taxation of income from labor and a large 
swath of income from capital. It leaves only interest, rents, annuities, some royalties, and non-
qualified dividends as the categories of income from capital that are not taxed at a preferential rate. 
Admittedly, those categories of income are subject to possibly higher marginal rates than income 
from labor because they produce ordinary income that could also be subject to the section 1411 tax. 
When that occurs, that income from capital could be taxed at a higher rate than income from labor 
if one considers only the income tax. Adding the employment taxes changes that picture 
considerably. It is unclear whether by making carried interest short-term capital gain for three years 
the TCJA will also result in converting that income into investment income for purposes of the 
section 1411 tax. Moreover, the social security and self-employment taxes, which are substantial, 
only apply to income from labor. I.R.C. §§ 3101, 1401. 
 58. Before the TCJA the Code distinguished between types of labor income, but it did so in 
more attenuated ways. First, the Code distinguished between employees and independent 
contractors by allowing the latter to deduct ordinary and necessary business expenses from gross 
income in arriving at adjusted gross income, I.R.C. § 62(a)1)—making those expenses so-called 
above-the-line deductions—while relegating unreimbursed employee business expenses to the 
worst possible status, short of non-deductibility. Unreimbursed employee business expenses were 
not only itemized deductions (not useful to anyone who took the standard deduction, I.R.C. § 63(b), 
(d)), but they were miscellaneous itemized deductions, which were only deductible to the extent 
that they exceeded 2% of the taxpayer’s adjusted gross income, I.R.C. §67, and were not deductible 
at all for any taxpayer subject to the alternative minimum tax (“AMT”), I.R.C. §§ 55, 
56(b)(1)(A)(i). Hence, whereas independent contractors could always use their ordinary and 
necessary business expenses in determining their tax base, employees in many cases could not, and 
even if they could, they would not be able to deduct all of them because of the section 67 two 
percent floor. 
  Although that was an important difference, which provided a clear preference for 
independent contractors over employees, the distinction could be justified on at least two policy 
grounds. First, the restrictions applicable to the deductibility of unreimbursed employee business 
expenses improved the administrability of the tax system by relieving many employees of the need 
to keep records of their unreimbursed employee business expenses. For example, employees who 
knew they were subject to the AMT didn’t need to bother keeping track of their unreimbursed 
employee business expenses because they knew they were not going to be able to deduct them 
anyway. Nondeductibility also enhanced administrability on the government’s side because the IRS 
would not need to audit the propriety of a deduction which could not be taken. 
  Second, the distinction could also be justified by the fact that it neutralized, at least on a 
system wide basis, to some extent the advantage provided to employees as a result of the many 
fringe benefits that the Code excludes from gross income. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 106, 119, 132. Those 
same benefits, if provided to an independent contractor, would be income to them. And only 
employees can benefit from employer-provided retirement plans, which do not result in current 
income to them. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 401. 
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compensation for labor, not capital, and were being taxed 
inappropriately when the application of subchapter K allowed them to 
be taxed as income from capital. To the extent that the TCJA will 
cause more of that income to be taxed at the same rate as income from 
labor (by treating it as short-term capital gain, and hence taxable at 
ordinary income rates for the first three years),59 the TCJA removes 
that disparate treatment. The problem is that by adding a deduction of 
20 percent of a taxpayer’s “Qualified Business Income” (section 
199A), the TCJA introduces a more pervasive distinction. 
The deduction provided by section 199A (the “QBI deduction”) 
distinguishes between income from labor that is paid in the form of 
wages and income from labor that is paid in any other form—because 
the business of being an employee can never constitute a “qualified 
trade or business,” wages, the income from that business, can never be 
QBI.60 And because the business of performing services as an 
employee can never produce QBI, employees will never be entitled to 
the QBI deduction. 
By stark contrast, many individuals who are independent 
contractors and other unincorporated service providers will be entitled 
to the QBI deduction. Therefore, section 199A creates a difference in 
the maximum rate of tax that will apply to labor income received by 
employees and non-employee service providers (independent 
contractors, sole proprietors, and members of any other entity that has 
not elected to be treated as a corporation for income tax purposes).61 
While wages remain subject to tax as ordinary income in full, section 
199A reduces the maximum rate of tax on QBI from 37% to 29.6% 
(20% of 37%). And although section 199A contains “guardrails” 
designed to prevent application of the deduction to some types of 
personal service income which is often received in the form of wages, 
it is far from clear how effective those guardrails will be.62 
 
 59. I.R.C. § 1061 (2018). 
 60. I.R.C. § 199A(d) (2018). 
 61. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3 (2006). 
 62. One such guardrail is section 199A(c)(4)(A), which excludes from the definition of QBI 
“reasonable compensation paid to the taxpayer by any qualified trade or business of the taxpayer 
for services rendered with respect to the trade or business.” See Shu-Yi Oei & Diane Ring, Is New 
Code Section 199A Really Going to Turn Us All into Independent Contractors?, SSRN (Jan. 12, 
2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3101180. Section 199A excludes from 
the definition of “qualified business” certain “specified businesses” which are then defined as “any 
trade or business involving the performance of services in the fields of health, law, accounting, 
actuarial science, performing arts, consulting, athletics, financial services, brokerage services, or 
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Distinguishing between wages and other forms of compensation 
for personal services in such a salient way dramatically changes the 
values that the tax system reflects. It magnifies the ways in which 
wage income is disfavored because it categorically excludes 
employees from its benefits, no matter what.63 The values proclaimed 
by an income tax system that assigns to employees some of the highest 
effective rates of income tax possible are fundamentally different from 
those proclaimed by an income tax system that treats all—or even 
most—compensation for personal services alike.64 
Although section 199A is not the first income tax provision that 
disfavors employees,65 it does so in a particularly salient way.66 It 
reduces the effective rate of tax on a particular type of compensation 
for services rendered and therefore represents a frontal attack on the 
principles of horizontal equity and ability to pay. And unlike some of 
the other ways in which the income tax disfavors employee 
compensation, section 199A cannot be justified on the ground of 
 
any trade or business where the principal asset of such trade or business is the reputation or skill of 
1 or more of its employees . . . .” I.R.C. §§ 199A(d), 1202(e)(3)(A) (2018). The reason may be that 
the identified fields are ones in which many individuals perform services as employees; the 
dramatic difference in treatment afforded by section 199A based on worker classification may have 
been thought unwarranted in those circumstances. Nevertheless, at certain relatively low income 
levels, the difference will exist. See I.R.C. § 199A(d)(3) (2018). 
 63. See I.R.C. § 67 (2018). Although wage income was disfavored under prior law because of 
the limited deductibility of unreimbursed employee business expenses under the regular tax, which 
became full non-deductibility for taxpayers who paid the AMT, the TCJA exacerbates the 
disfavored status of wages. Under prior law, only employees who had unreimbursed business 
expenses felt the effect of the disfavored status of wage income. But because the TCJA makes 
miscellaneous itemized deductions not deductible in all cases (until 2025), it magnifies the disfavor 
in which the tax system seems to hold wage income for those who itemize while also extending 
that disfavor to those who don’t by denying them the QBI deduction. The TCJA now disfavors all 
wage income, for all taxpayers. 
 64. The only income that might be taxed more heavily than wages under the income tax, at 
least in some cases, is income from interest, royalties, and non-qualified dividends (not subject to 
tax as net capital gain under section 1(h)(11). Such income is ordinary income and could be subject 
to the net investment income tax provided under section 1411 if, together with other net investment 
income, it exceeds the threshold amount in section 1411. In that case, such income would be subject 
to the additional tax of 3.8% provided by that section bringing the marginal rate to 40.8%—
obviously higher than the maximum rate of 37% which applies to ordinary income. I.R.C. §§ 1, 
1411(a)(1). 
 65. As discussed more fully in note 58, supra, by relegating unreimbursed employee business 
expenses to the category not only of itemized deductions but also of miscellaneous itemized 
deductions subject to the 2% floor of section 67 and non-deductible under the AMT, the tax system 
quite explicitly disfavors employees over independent contractors, although it does so in a way 
many taxpayers neither realize nor understand. I.R.C. §§ 67, 55. 
 66. Other provisions of the TCJA which reduce excludable fringe benefits contribute to the  
unfavorable tax treatment of employees. See Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 115-97, §§ 11047, 
13304, 131 Stat. 2088, 2124 (2017). 
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administrability or being the flip side of the excludability of fringe 
benefits.67 Even if the reason for the distinction is grounded in 
economics—the relative inelasticity of the labor supply—the result 
remains that the TCJA is saying to employees that they are less worthy 
of tax relief than other labor providers. 
V.  ZERO-TAXING FOREIGN SOURCE INCOME—THE DEMISE  
OF CAPITAL EXPORT NEUTRALITY 
The TCJA creates a permanent and structural distinction based on 
the source of income. Thanks to the deduction provided by new 
section 245A, the U.S. income tax system will for the first time not 
include in the tax base some income from non-U.S. sources—ever—
for some taxpayers. Taxpayers to whom new section 245A applies will 
be able to receive dividends consisting of income earned abroad, but 
because section 245A will allow them to deduct the amount of such 
dividends received, no amount of the dividend will become taxable 
income. Therefore, no amount of the dividend will be subject to U.S. 
income tax. That is a significant change in the law, although it is a 
change of degree, not kind. 
Since the enactment of Subpart F in 1962, the U.S. tax system had 
sought to subject income earned by U.S. persons operating abroad to 
U.S. tax, but had settled on doing so only when that income was 
brought back into the U.S.68 Subpart F brokered a compromise 
between capital import neutrality and capital export neutrality by 
deferring U.S. taxation of foreign source income earned abroad until 
that income was repatriated.69 The U.S. tax system was a hybrid—
nominally worldwide because active business foreign source income 
would be subject to U.S. tax eventually, when it was repatriated, but 
temporally territorial because active business foreign source income 
would not be subject to U.S. tax unless it was repatriated. 
 
 67. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.  
 68. Revenue Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-834, §§ 11, 12, 76 Stat. 960 (1962). 
 69. Capital import neutrality is the concept that all income derived from one location ought to 
bear the same tax burden. See David A. Weisbach, The Use of Neutralities in International Tax 
Policy, 68 NAT’L TAX J. 635, 637 (2015). Capital export neutrality is the concept that all income 
derived by U.S. persons ought to bear the same amount of tax. Id. The two concepts cannot be 
operationalized simultaneously, and Subpart F brokered a compromise by deferring U.S. taxation 
of the active income of U.S persons until the income was repatriated to the U.S. Capital import 
neutrality reigned while the income remained abroad, but capital export neutrality reigned when it 
arrived in the U.S. 
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The enactment of new section 245A produces a system in which 
some foreign source income will never be subject to U.S. tax despite 
being brought into the U.S., and that is a change, even though it is not 
a change that converts the U.S. tax system into a territorial system. 
The new system is not territorial because the distinction the TCJA 
creates only applies to some foreign source income and anti-abuse 
rules will ensure that other foreign source income will be subject to 
U.S. tax.70 Hence, the foreign source income of a foreign corporation 
owned by U.S. corporate shareholders will escape U.S. taxation when 
distributed as a dividend to its U.S. corporate shareholders, but other 
foreign source income beneficially owned by U.S. persons will not 
meet that happy fate. That other foreign source income will continue 
to be subject to the Subpart F regime as well as to the new taxes 
imposed as anti-abuse measures. The shift to a territorial system is, at 
best, incomplete. 
By distinguishing between foreign and domestic source income 
and subjecting one to U.S. taxation at some point while completely 
freeing the other from such taxation, the TCJA has vanquished capital 
export neutrality and the domestic horizontal equity values it 
represents. That could be understandable as an alternative resolution 
of the conflict between capital income and capital export neutrality, 
but the TCJA does not resolve the conflict. The TCJA has created a 
system in which foreign source income earned in corporate form and 
distributed to corporate owners will not be subject to U.S. tax, but 
other foreign source income will be. Subpart F remains in place. By 
declaring capital import neutrality the victor in some cases but leaving 
the Subpart F compromise intact in others, the TCJA has produced a 
system in which U.S. taxation will depend on a combination of the 
source of the income and the form in which the income is produced 
and owned. 
This is haphazard tax policy at best. Under the TCJA, horizontal 
equity is turned on its head: U.S. taxpayers with equal incomes will be 
treated dissimilarly based on the source of their income and the type 
of entity that generates it. Ironically, the fundamental policy change 
that was most extensively analyzed and debated in the run-up to 
 
 70. These include the tax on “global intangible low tax income”—GILTI—imposed by new 
section 951A, a tax on some foreign source income, and the “base erosion anti abuse tax” imposed 
by new section 59A on certain U.S. taxpayers who make relatively large, deductible payments to 
related foreign entities. 
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enactment71—the shift to territorial taxation—is one of the least 
complete. Because the TCJA operationalizes the concept of territorial 
taxation through the mechanism of a deduction, and a dividends 
received deduction (“DRD”) at that, it operationalizes the concept 
only partially. The DRD is only available with respect to income 
earned in corporate form and paid to owners whose investment is also 
held in corporate form. There can hardly be a sound policy basis for 
such a distinction. 
Whether this will lead to the incorporation of most foreign 
activities of U.S. persons is beside the point made here. The point is 
that although the fundamental structure of the international tax system 
remains the same—worldwide taxation implemented by the 
provisions of subpart F and the PFIC regime72 and ameliorated by the 
foreign tax credit—there is now an exception to U.S. taxation in 
certain cases. That exception allows the repatriation of earnings in the 
form of dividends that entitle a corporate recipient to the new DRD 
provided by section 245A. The incomplete transformation of the 
income tax from worldwide to territorial taxation exacerbates, without 
any apparent policy foundation whatsoever, the disparate ways in 
which the tax system taxes income generated in corporate form and 
income generated by pass-through entities or by individuals.73 
VI.  ADDITIONAL OBSERVATIONS 
A.  Adopting the AMT Base 
Some of the changes that I have described as fundamental policy 
shifts made by the TCJA are not, in isolation, new to the tax system. 
They are only new to the “regular” tax system—but that is an 
 
 71. See J. Clifton Fleming, Jr. & Robert J. Peroni, A Hitchhiker’s Guide to Outbound 
International Tax Reform, 18 CHAP. L. REV. 133, 136 (2014); J. Clifton Fleming, Jr., Robert J. 
Peroni & Stephen E. Shay, Perspectives on the Worldwide vs. Territorial Taxation Debate, 125 
TAX NOTES 1079, 1088 (2009); Stephen E. Shay et al., Designing a 21st Century Corporate Tax – 
An Advance U.S. Minimum Tax on Foreign Income and Other Measures to Protect the Base, 17 
FLA. TAX REV. 669, 684 (2015); Tax Reform Task Force, A Better Way: Our Vision for a Confident 
America, BETTER OFF NOW (2016), https://www.novoco.com/sites/default/files/atoms/files/ 
ryan_a_better_way_policy_paper_062416.pdf. 
 72. The Passive Foreign Investment Company provisions were designed to prevent erosion of 
the U.S. tax base by the creation of foreign companies to hold investments of U.S. persons. See Phil 
Jelsma, Understanding PFICs and QEFs, 14 INT’L TAX J. 317, 319 (1988). 
 73. For an excellent discussion of this point, see Mindy Herzfeld, How Some Taxpayers Got 
Cut Out of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, TAX NOTES (Jan. 23, 2018), https://www.taxnotes.com/tax-
reform/news-analysis-how-some-taxpayers-got-cut-out-tax-cuts-and-jobs-act. 
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important point. The denial of personal and dependency exemptions, 
miscellaneous itemized deductions (including unreimbursed 
employee business expenses and section 212 expenses), and the near-
elimination of the deduction for state and local taxes, all features of 
the tax law post-TCJA, reflect a decision to jettison the regular tax 
base and adopt the base of the Alternative Minimum Tax (“AMT”) in 
its stead.74 But it is one thing to have provisions that are alternative to 
what is considered the regular base and quite another to make those 
provisions the regular base, especially when the alternative—the 
AMT—is retained. When the provisions are alternatives that serve 
only to increase a taxpayer’s final tax liability, they are mere rate 
increases that operationalize the principle of vertical equity (also a 
measure of ability to pay). As such they do no violence to the 
fundamental principles of the tax system and the values it reflects by 
the way it determines the tax base. But when those provisions 
determine the regular tax base they change the fundamental principles 
and values of the tax system. And those changes are important. As 
Professor Ed Kleinbard has recently observed, “Fiscal policy is an 
exercise in applied economics, but also in applied moral philosophy. 
We define ourselves as a country through the covenantal bonds we 
construct for our society by means of the fiscal policies we adopt.”75 
A country that is indifferent to the support obligations of its 
constituents in determining their ability to pay taxes devalues those 
obligations. It discards the duty of support and communitarianism as 
a “covenantal bond” and reaffirms insular individualism. Whether that 
is good or bad is open to debate, but my concern is that the debate was 
not had before these changes became the law. The AMT base is 
undoubtedly simpler to administer and to comply with than the regular 
tax base, but that simplicity comes with significant costs to the 
principles of horizontal equity and ability to pay. It is unfortunate that 
it was adopted without a careful weighing of its costs as well as its 
benefits. 
 
 74. I.R.C. §§ 55–56 (2018). In this respect, the TCJA reflects adoption of portions of both the 
Camp and Graetz proposals, including in the case of the latter, the expansion of the standard 
deduction. Tax Reform Act of 2014, H.R. 1, 113th Cong. (2014); MICHAEL J. GRAETZ, 100 
MILLION UNNECESSARY RETURNS: A SIMPLE, FAIR, AND COMPETITIVE TAX PLAN FOR THE 
UNITED STATES (2008). 
 75. Edward D. Kleinbard, What’s a Government Good For? Fiscal Policy in an Age of 
Inequality, USC LEGAL STUDIES RESEARCH PAPERS SERIES NO. 18-2 (Feb. 5, 2018), https:// 
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3118406. 
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B.  Reliance on Standards 
Second, the TCJA contains many provisions that invite 
interpretation as standards, rather than as rules. The need to determine 
what constitutes a trade or business for purposes of determining the 
amounts deductible as QBI under new section 199A is only one 
example of Congress’ use of a standard to determine the contours of a 
provision that will affect a large swath of the taxpaying population. 
Reasonable compensation, also important in section 199A, is another 
one, as is earnings and profits, key to some of the new international 
provisions. 
Standards are easy to promulgate but hard to administer, whereas 
rules are hard to promulgate but easy to administer. As Louis Kaplow 
long ago observed, “[r]ules are more costly to promulgate than 
standards because rules involve advance determinations of the law’s 
content, whereas standards are more costly for legal advisors to predict 
or enforcement authorities to apply because they require later 
determinations of the law’s content.”76 In applying a standard, 
taxpayers, their advisors, courts, and administrators must weigh 
multiple competing factors and values, and they must do that ex-post, 
after taxpayers have acted. Standards can therefore create uncertainty, 
which is disconcerting to taxpayers and their advisors, who are left to 
interpret the standard when deciding how to treat particular items 
when filing tax returns. 
The Internal Revenue Code contains many provisions that are 
more properly interpreted as standards rather than as rules, so what 
Congress did in the TCJA is not new.77 It is also not surprising, given 
that the TCJA proceeded through the legislative process with 
unprecedented speed. But by using easy-to-create standards in many 
key provisions, the TCJA has imposed significant new burdens on 
 
 76. Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 562–
63 (1992). In other work, Rick Greenstein and I have challenged the binary classification of legal 
provisions into rules and standards, arguing that those are end points on what is more accurately 
analyzed as a continuum. See Alice G. Abreu & Richard K. Greenstein, The Rule of Law as a Law 
of Standards: Interpreting the Internal Revenue Code, 64 DUKE L.J. ONLINE 53, 73 n.83 (2015); 
Alice G. Abreu & Richard K. Greenstein, It’s Not a Rule: A Better Way to Understand the 
Definition of Income, 13 FLA. TAX REV. 101, 124 (2012); Alice G. Abreu & Richard K. Greenstein, 
Defining Income, 11 FLA. TAX REV. 295, 330 (2011) [hereinafter Abreu & Greenstein, Defining 
Income]. Nevertheless, although we have not retreated from our claim regarding the benefits of that 
more nuanced analysis, for purposes of evaluating the TCJA, that nuance is unnecessary. The 
binary analysis employed by Kaplow suffices. 
 77. See Abreu & Greenstein, Defining Income, supra note 76 at 300. 
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taxpayers and their advisors. Those constituencies are left to hope that 
Congress will provide the Treasury and the IRS with the funds 
necessary to allow them to provide the interpretive guidance needed 
to ensure uniform interpretation of the law. I can only hope that the 
Treasury and the IRS will be able to write regulations that craft 
simplifying conventions and de minimis rules that interpret the broad 
standards in ways that make them administrable, as they did with the 
so-called INDOPCO regulations over a decade ago.78 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
The TCJA has changed the way the tax system operationalizes the 
principles of horizontal equity and ability to pay, has brought the base 
of the regular tax closer to the base of the AMT, and has increased the 
number of tax provisions that have been promulgated in the form of 
standards, which will require the deployment of significant 
administrative and judicial resources before they can be implemented 
effectively. By removing consideration of taxpayers’ support 
obligations from the tax base (except as relevant to the determination 
of filing status in the case of taxpayers who might qualify for the 
statuses of head of household or surviving spouse), the TCJA has 
jettisoned the value of ability to pay. It has created a system in which 
two taxpayers with very different ability to pay as a result of support 
obligations will be taxed the same, and in which two taxpayers with 
the same ability to pay will be taxed differently. It has therefore turned 
the concept of horizontal equity on its head. In some cases the tax base 
will be the taxpayer’s gross income in its entirety, subjecting to 
taxation even the amount needed for minimal subsistence. 
Those effects are exacerbated by the creation of a distinction in 
the taxation of income from labor, which will now depend on the form 
in which that income is earned. Labor income earned in the form of 
wages—by the performance of services as an employee—will be fully 
taxed at ordinary income rates. But some labor income earned by the 
performance of services in any other way—by the performance of 
services as an independent contractor, proprietorship, partnership, or 
 
 78. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. §§ 1.263(a)–4(d)(6)(v) (creating a de minimis rule allowing 
expensing of amounts of $5,000 or less used to financial intangible assets); Treas. Reg. §§ 1.263(a)–
4(e)(4)(iii) (creating another de minimis rule allowing expensing of $5,000 or less of investigatory 
transaction costs); Treas. Reg. §§ 1.263(a)–4(f)(1) (creating a “12-month rule” that allows 
expensing of amounts that create or facilitate the creation of rights that extend up to 12 months 
beyond the year in which the taxpayer pays or incurs the expense). 
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S Corporation—will be taxed at only 80 percent of the ordinary 
income rate that would otherwise apply. That last caveat, which 
highlights the muddiness of the application of the new deduction for 
Qualified Business Income, only exacerbates the serendipity of the 
policy effects and the disconnect between taxation and ability to pay 
under the TCJA. 
The foregoing fundamental changes to the tax system were not 
clearly identified and debated by scholars and tax professionals prior 
to enactment, but the idea of shifting to a territorial system was.79 
Ironically, that change was incompletely accomplished. That 
incompleteness has only added to the serendipity with which the TCJA 
imposes its burdens and distributes its benefits. The TCJA 
distinguishes between the taxation of foreign and domestic source 
income only for some taxpayers. It lacks a comprehensive policy 
foundation either domestically, or internationally. 
Reform is a value-laden term. It implies a change for the better. 
The TCJA was billed as Tax Reform, but it will take scholars years to 
tease out and analyze all of the policy implications of all of the changes 
wrought by the TCJA. In this Essay, I have tried to begin the 
evolutionary progression from discussion of how the new provisions 
operate to discussion of fundamental policy shifts. Only by engaging 
in the latter discussion can we answer the question whether the TCJA 
has reformed anything at all. My feeling at the moment is that it has 
not, or it has not reformed a lot. On the contrary, it has deformed the 
operation of the principles of horizontal equity and ability to pay. I 
will have to wait and see if a consensus develops around these 
observations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 79. See supra note 58. 
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